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IN THE SUPRE~E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PHIL L. HANSEN, No. 15613 
Appellant. 
REPLY ERIEF OF APPELLAK7 
rnTRODUCTIOJ; 
Aprellant Phil L. Hansen respectfully submits the follow-
i::~ brief in reply to the Brief of the Utah State Bar. 
1he Ear's brief to tnis Court is for the most part a per-
sonal attack upon appellant, his "attitude" toward the Bar, 
0
' • '1is general p'1ilosophy concerning the 0har~in;! of legal 
Eve:i more disagreeable, however, is the Ear's manifest 
==~te~::t toward appellant's assertion of his constitutional 
ri;~,ts. Of all the institutions of our community, one would 
tx;::ect t'1e Ear to abide by its own rules, especially as those 
rJles i~plement fundamental concepts of due process. Yet the 
~3r i:i this case has violated its own rules and. just as sig-
·:ficantly, has belittled appellant for calling those viola-
:~·.oo to the attention of this Court. The Bar has lost per-
s~ective in this case; in its zeal to prosecute appellant. it 
r~s transgressed its duties to the community. 
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The Bar faults aopellant for suggesting that the "distir-
•uished rr.emt-ez's of thio Utah State Eoard of Commissioners" CG"· , 
mitted error in connection with this proceeding. For appe). 
lant to claim error is characterized as "most brazen." yp· 
even courts on occasion err. To claim error is not a persono. 
assault on the integrity of a tribunal. The Bar's unrestra:"-
ec reaction in this appeal is therefore surprising. In t'.c 
context of this entire proceeding, however, it is symptomatic. 
For the do11inant theme of the Ear in this proceeding has bee" 
an::l continues to be that the nonconformist must be exrelle: 
fro r- t '1 e c 1 u b . To the Ear, allegations concerning the inci· 
dent in question seem quite beside the point. Rather, th: 
individual, his attitude, his philosophy and his brazen im· 
pudence tc question the Bar, are the points upon which the Pa'. 
has chose~ to focus. 
ARGUMENT 
nct·~·ithst::inding the Bar's arguments to the contran. 
acpellant was denied due process of law with respect to the 
allecej violations of DRS-105 and DR2-106. Moreover, i: 
dra•.-iin[; all inferences against appellant, the Bar Comrr:issi~r· 
ers consistently ignored repeated and obvious contradicticr' 
in the testimony against appellant. For this reason, amoc~ 
otr:ers, the Bar Commission's recommendation to this Cot_: rt "'-
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not based upon clear and convincing evidence. The Bar Commis-
sion' s overriding concern for appellant's general philosophi-
cal position on client relations is not an appropriate ground 
for the severe punishment it recommends. Finally, the Bar's 
recomended discipline is, by all standards, unreasonable and 
excessive. 
I. APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
A. Appellant was never charged with a violation of 
DRS:.::1o~--------------------------------
The Bar admits that the Complaint herein charged appel-
lant with a violation of DR5-101 and that appellant was found 
:r. viol:i.tion of DRS-105, whicl1 was never mentioned in the Corn-
pl:i.int. The Bar characterizes this as a "mistake caused 
either by a typographical error or by inadvertence on the part 
of the Screening Committee." Brief of the Utah State Ear at 
I?. If this, in fact, was a mistake (and there is no evidence 
in the record which would support such an assertion), it was 
certainly compounded by the action of the prosecutors repre-
senting the Ear. The Complaint was never amended; no motio:i 
t'.) amend was ever rr.ade. The Complaint was filed on December 
co. 1976, discovery was pursued, and the hearing was held al-
rrGst a year later on September 29, 1977. Although the Corn-
claint had been pending for almost a year, no effort was made 
the hearing to correct what the Bar now characterizes as a 
-3-
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mere typographical error. Indeed the Bar's prosecutor cor.-
firmed its "mistake" as fact at the hearing: 
MP. FISHLER: we will proceed with the issue of 
conflict of interest and we will proceed on the issue 
of an excessive fee. I'm talking about 2-101 insofar 
as we are talking about conflict of interest, 2-106 
insofar as the fee is concerned. 
1 t1R. MOFFAT: Okay, then you at this time move--
''MR. BLACK: I think that's 5-101. 
"MR. MOFFAT: Yes, 5-101 and 2-106. 
"I.If. rISHLER: That's correct.'' Tr. 3. 
It is irrelevant, however, whether one characterizes the Ear'' 
failure to allege any violation of DR5-101 as a mistake. Mis-
take er not, the Corr.plaint was defective and deprived appel-
lant of notice of the charge against him. 
f<emarkatly, the Far argues that appellant is himself a: 
fault fer not correcting the Bar's error. The Far asserto 
tnat appellant sor;ehow had actual knowledge of what the ccr-
rect charge should have been; the defenses asserted by appe> 
lant are held to be indicative of his understanding and "or-
vi o us notice of the correct ch a r g e. '' 
Es.r at 15. Since al 1 lawyers are char'1ed with knowledge c: 
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Bar furthe~ 
ar'1ues, appellant should have known that his conduct was i~ 
violation of DRS-105. Appellant, in effect, is charf'ed i'i" 
the burden to fashion the charge against himself. 
-4-
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These ar~uments deserve but two comments. First, it is 
perfectly proper for an accused tc interpose such defenses as 
;.e deer.os approoricite unjer the circumstances. It does not 
follow, however, that he be required to guess at the rule that 
he is said to have violated. Second, Rule III, paragraph 1 of 
in part: 
'The complaint shall set forth in clear and con-
cise language the facts upon which the charge of oro-
f es s i ona 1 misconduct is based ~f!sl__!_b~_P-9£_! i c ~1 ~i' __ P!:'-9_:-
vision of the Code of Ethics whic!'l the attorney is 
.§::_c-~~se d _of _-yTo 1 a! }iJg-.-, :----rtm p 1la sis a-d-ded:! ___ - - -----
:ne Rule is clear and mandatory. Not only must the Complaint 
ccntain sufficient factual allegations to notify the accusej 
of the charge; but it must also specify the exact disciplinary 
rules that the lawyer is accused of violating. In this res-
pect, the nule implements the statutory requirement that 
"[a]ny rr,ember of the Utah State Bar complained of shall have 
nctice of the charges against him and the opportunity to de-
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-15 ( 1953). The Bar ad mi ts 
that nc such notice was given appellant; the Ear's failure to 
rive notice is not cured by calling it a mistake. 
The Ear's more adventurous contention in this regard is 
'1) that disciplinary proceedings in this State are governed 
cy the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) that appellant's 
fulure to object to the "erroneous" Complaint constituted his 
-5-
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implied consent to an amendment of the pleadings in conforrr.it, 
with the evidence, under Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Pre-
----------------------
cedure. The Bar fails to cite, however, any Rule of Disci-
pline that adopts the provisions of the Utah Rules of CivL 
Procedure to Bar disciplinary proceedings. With the sole ex-
ception created by Rule X, paragraph 4 of the Revised Rules c'. 
Discipline (which provides that participants in such proceed-
ings rTJay conduct discovery in accordance with Rules 26 to 37), 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have no bearing upon a law-
yer's procedural rights in disciplinary proceedings. The Bar 
mistakenly relies upon the ruling of the New Mexico court in 
!0_!:~-~-~s!_~ll__o, 84 N.M. 10, 498 P.2d 1353 (1972). In that casE 
the court based its ruling upon a state supreme court rule to 
the effect that attorney disciplinary proceedings are i;tovernec 
by applicable rules of civil procedure in circumstances not 
otherwise provided for under the supreme court rules. The 
Utah Supreme Court has not aoproved or promulgated any similar 
rule applicable to this case. Thus, the Bar's argument en-
tails an unwarranted application of the rules of civil procE-
dure to disciplinary proceedings. More importantly, the E3r 
would have this Court ignore the plain terms of its own Rules 
of Discipline, which required the Complaint to set forth th' 
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility that ar-
pellant is said to have violated. 
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The Bar's position ultimately reduces itself to the non-
sensical proposition that, because "[d]isciplinary proceedings 
are technically neither civil nor criminal" (Er~_.§_£_clf_ _ _t:-_~ 
Ut~t-__:?_1:-_9_~§-~_9.__r:' at 15), the Bar is free to ignore its own rules 
cf orocedure and arbitrarily to adopt some more liberal stan-
c2rd of notice in order to sustain appellant's suspension from 
rractice. The United States Supreme Court, however, has char-
22terized such proceedings as this one as "adversary proceed-
in'!s of a quasicriminal nature.'' 
5:,2 (1965). Contrary to the bar's arguments, both the United 
States Supreme Coc:rt and this Court have held that attorneys 
accused of ethical violations are entitled to full protection 
of the t_;uar3ntees of due process. Id. at 550; !Q___!'~_E_vans, 42 
Ut3n 282, 130 P. 217 (1913). 
Ut2h 562, 232 P. 914 (1924). Appellant was charged with vio-
lation of one disciplinary rule and convicted of violating an-
Appellant has been denied the procedural due process 
r~3ranteed him by the Ear's rules of discioline. 
Jiule II, paragraph 6 of the Bar's Revised Rules of Dis-
:ipline provides: 
The Ethics and Discioline Committee shall 
afford to the accused attorney an opportunity to 
-7-
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appear and present any defenses which he may have 
to the charges before the Committee shall recom-
mend censure, or before the filing of a forncal 
Complaint." 
The foregoing rule necessarily assumes that the accused attor-
ney shall have notice of the charges against him in advance c' 
the Screening Committee hearing. How else can the acc"sE: 
reasonably present defenses to those charges? 
The only notice of any charge against appellant was th2' 
contained in Kay-Lou Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Company's letter c: 
August 25. 1976 to the Bar (Ex. 20), a copy of which was for-
ward ea to appellant on September 2, 1976. Nothing in th.2'. 
letter suggests or implies that either Kay-Lou Chevrolet-
Oldsmobile or its president, Mrs. Behunin, believed appel-
lant 's fee to be excessive. Nothin'-T in the letter complain: 
of appellant's flat fee having included costs. Nothing in t 0 : 
letter reflects displeasure with the 'structure" of appel-
lant's fee. The very most that can be said of the letter i· 
this respect is that Mrs. Behunin expressed her desire to r 0-
cover a portion of the fee if and w>-ien stce should decidt t· 
hire another lawyer in appellant's place. As a matter of f3c' 
ignored by the Bar, appellant returned a portion of his $5.':,. 
fee, and t-Jrs. Behunin executed a release therefor. Thus Ve 
only dispute raised in the August 25 letter has been settle~. 
The Bar, however, has used the letter as the basis of it' 
-8-
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--
general attack upon appellant's ''fee structure.•· Appellant 
nad no notice of the Bar's intentions in advance of the 
Screening Committee hearing. 
The Bar argues that if appellant was not satisfied with 
the specifics of the initial charge, he could have conducted 
discovery in order to refine his knowledge of those charges. 
Once again, the Bar indul1tes in the fantasy that one accused 
in a disciplinary hearing has the burden to insure that due 
process is done to himself. The Bar suggests that throughout 
the proceedings appellant had adequate notice "that both the 
amount of his fee acj the structure of his fee was bein~ scru-
tinized and examined." Brief of the Utah State Bar at 22. 
----------------------
The Bar cannot be serious in suggesting that the accused must 
:Hvine the nature of charges against him by analyzinf!: ques-
tions asked by the prosecutors or comments made by the Hearing 
Comrr:ittee. The clear and erroneous import of the Bar's argu-
ment is that the disciplinary rules do not require notice; if 
an accused claims a denial of due process on that account, his 
claim •·can only be termed as a smokescreen attempt to divert 
this Court from an examination of the substance of the 
charge." The Ear's 
position in regard to the constitutional questions at issue in 
this matter is cavalier to say the least. 
-9-
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II. THE BAR'S RECOMMENDATION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
PROPER EVIDENCE. 
A. The record contains no evidence to support the 
Bar's conclusion that appellant's fee was clearly 
excessive. 
DR2-106(B) provides in part: 
"A fee is clearly excessive when, after a re-
view of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence 
would be left with a definite and firm conviction 
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." 
The only evidence adduced at the hearing concerning appel-
lant's fee was the testimony of appellant himself. As demon-
strated in detail at pages 3 to 5 of appellant's initial brief 
herein, appellant considered a variety of factors in fixing 
his fee to Kay-Lou Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Company, including the 
amount at stake in the suit, anticipated needs of discovery, 
travel from Salt Lake City to Richfield, the need for an expe-
rienced investigator, and appellant's experience, reputat1or. 
and ability. Pursuant to his agreement with Mrs. Behunin'; 
company, appellant and his associates researched the lega: 
questions involved in the suit (Tr. 63); appellant met witr. 
Mrs. Behunin and her company's bookkeeper (Tr. 1tl, 20, 65): 
appellant employed an investigator and reviewed his work (Tr. 
64); appellant conferred with opposing counsel and filed ap-
propriate pleadings (Ex. 33); and, at Mrs. Behunin's request. 
appellant obtained continuances of the trial (Tr. 90, 91, 94 
and Ex. 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19). The fee that appellant a~,j 
-10-
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Krs. Behunin agreed upon was not clearly excessive in light of 
tne facts known to appellant at the time of their a~reement. 
II or , in 1 i g h t of a pp e 11 ant ' s refund of a Dort i or. of the fee , 
was he paid a clearly excessive fee for the services that he 
performed. 
But the burden was not upon appellant to prove that his 
fee was reasonable. Rather, the burden was upon the Bar to 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that his fee was in 
excess of a reasonable fee. The Bar failed to offer any such 
evidence at the hearing. The Bar argues that the me'llbers of 
tne Hearing Committee, the Board of Commissioners and this 
Court are lawyers 'of ordinary prudence" and therefore able to 
determine a reasonable fee without aid of evidence on the 
ouestion. Either the Ear ignores the law of evidence or it is 
arguing. without authority, for a unique rule of proof in 
disciplinary proceedings such as the present one. 
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the party seeking 
to prove the reasonableness or excessiveness of an attorney's 
fee must present evidence establishing a reasonable fee. The 
judges, whether they be the members of a Hearing Committee or 
trie members cf this Court, cannot supply the missing evidence 
simply because they 
FE'. !CI'~~ ti .SJ Q _ __f.Sl.t::.P • , 
considered whether 
are lawyers. In Cr!:J_s!§:".'~S:!!:!_.Y_'.__ GeorgetO\,'!:J 
541 P.2d 56 (Mont. 1975), the court 
a party could be awarded a reasonable 
-11-
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attorney's fee without presenting evidence on the question of 
what constituted a reasonable fee under the circumstances. 
The court held: 
"[I)n contested cases we are inclined to follow 
those states requiring the introduction of proof from 
which a reasonable fee may be determined. To award a 
fee in such a case without proof would be to disre-
gard the fundamental rules of evidence. An award of 
fees, like any other award, must be based on compe-
tent evidence." 
541 P.2d at 59. Accord: O'Donnell v. McGee Trucks, Inc., 294 
Minn. 110, 199 N.W.2d 432 (1972); Smith v. Davis, 453 S.W.2j 
340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Boyette v. Reliable Finance Co., 
1d4 S.2d 200 (Fla.App. 1966); Franklin Nat. Bank v. Feldman, 
112 Misc.2d 839, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1tl1 (1964); Bradford v. Sturman, 
ti6 Idaho 17ti, 3d4 P.2d 64 (1963); Getman v. Hayhow, 103 Okla. 
161, 229 P. 559 (1924). 
Al though the foregoing cases are not disciplinary pro-
ceedings against attorneys, the principle is precisely the 
same in the present case: neither this Court nor the members 
of the Bar Commission can take judicial notice of what con-
sti tut es a reasonable fee under the circumstances. That fact 
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. As a substi-
tute for that evidence, the Bar offers the Court what it be-
lieves to be the "method of computation of fees used i~. 
the normal legal community" (Brief of the Utah State Bar at 
47), and "the custom of the legal community" (id. at 431, 
wnich, the Bar asserts, are somehow fairer than appellant'' 
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r.ethod of charging fees. The Bar presented no evidence of any 
S'JCh standard "method" or "custom." Just as importantly, the 
E::or presented no testimony that would support the inherent 
fairness of the ';custom'; vis-a-vis appellant's practice. 
viithout evidence relating to the reasonableness of the par-
ticular fee charged by appellant, the Bar indulges in general-
ized speculation that falls short of clear and convincing 
evidence. Each of the authorities cited by the Bar at pages 
~2 to 53 of its Brief is directed at impeaching what the Ear 
call2 "Hansen's market theory" of fees. That theory and 
whatever general ethical and economic questions it raises 
are not at issue here. The only question before the Court is 
whether the fee charged and paid by Kay-Lou Chevrolet-Olds-
~otile Company was clearly excessive. The Bar failed to ad-
duce an_y evidence that the fee was excessive. 
E. Th_~ _Ba!:: __ f9_!!1mis~i_.9~ _§_£bi t£_§_.!::_lli_ _!:::!OSO}. ved ____ al! 
.:i:_~~ues cf _[_~co! __ again_~_§~pan~. 
The Bar argues that appellant has distorted the evidence 
lG supoort of his assertion that the findings and conclusions 
J'. the Commission were not supported by the evidence. It is 
~lairr.ed that appellant cites evidence most favorable to him-
self and ignores conflictin@: evidence which the Bar accepted 
as true. Appellant vigorously denies this assertion. Only 
:wu witnesses testified at the hearing. The prosecution 
-13-
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called Mrs. Behunin. and the appellant testified for himself. 
Mrs. Behunin' s testimony was full of errors, contradictions 
and in some cases obvious falsehoods. Appellant, on the other 
hand, was direct, forthright and consistent in his testirnonv. 
The record speaks for itself, and an examination of the recor: 
suggests that the Commission acted arbitrarily, capricious:. 
and unreasonably in believing Mrs. Behunin in every instance 
of a conflict. 
Mrs. Eehunin must have been a seasoned witness, since ste 
had been married five times (to Jenkins, \'Jheeler, Johnson, 
Hill and Behunin) (_e~l1__!:!!!_l._.!:!_J:)~p_sisition at 3-7; Tr. 36), and she 
had a regularly retained lawyer for her business affairs 
Nevertheless, her testimonv 
demonstrated anything but accuracy, consistency and candor. 
few examples are illustrative. 
1. On February 26, 1977, Mrs. Behunin wrote a letter 
to appellant, saying that she had retained another lawyer tc 
handle the case for which she had hired appellant; but she 
later admitted that this representation was false and that she 
did not in fact hire another lawyer until about one month af-
ter she had written that letter. Behunin Deposition at 55-56. 
2. Durini;r the hearinE!, Mrs. Behunin was aske~ 
whether she ;,ever" asked for a refund of the fee she had pa:: 
to appellant, and she said no. Tr. 28. A few minutes later. 
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she told a different story, and said that she had asked for a 
refund of part of the fee during a meeting with appellant and 
tnat appellant refused to say anything at all in answer to her 
request. Tr. 45-46. Not only is this testimony of Mrs. 
Behunin completely contradictory, but anyone who knows appel-
lant knows that he would not remain mute when asked for a re-
fund of the attorney fee. See Tr. 66-67. 
3. Mrs. Behunin testified at her deposition that she 
met with appellant in the Helper Club at Helper, Utah, in June 
1976 (Behunin Deposition at 37), and that they discussed the 
possibility that appellant might represent Ted Burr, but that 
there was never any discussion as to whether it would be wise 
to continue the civil case until the criminal case of Ted Burr 
was concluded. Behunin Deposition at 48-49. Within one week 
following that meeting, however, Mrs. Behunin induced Dr. 
Robert H. Crist to write to appellant in behalf of Mrs. 
Behunin, requesting that the civil case be continued because 
of Mrs. Behunin' s mental heal th, explaining that she was suf-
fering from insomnia and severe anxiety, and that she needed 
"to prepare herself psychologically and avoid further emotion-
al stress." Ex. 19. At the hearing, Mrs. Behunin admitted 
that she had obtained this letter for the purpose of aiding 
appellant in getting a continuance of the trial. Tr. 28-29. 
4. Mrs. Behunin testified in her deposition that her 
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first meeting with appellant was in September or October 0 ~ 
1975. Behunin Deposition at 14. Sne later admitted that ths 
meeting actually occurred in the latter part of December 0 : 
that year. Behunin Deposition at 24-25. She said that she 
was "sure" that she hadn't been served with summons and com-
plaint when she first met with appellant (Behunin Depositior1 
at 20), and then said that the lawsuit was "dated" December 
30, 1975 (Behunin Deposition at 25). She later admitted tha: 
she was actually served on December 17, 1975 (Behunin Deposi-
tion at 26), and that at her first visit with appellant she 
had in fact been served and that she was concerned about havir.g 
an answer prepared to the complaint. Behunin Deposition at 26. 
5. Mrs. Behunin also testified in her deposition 
that she "made about three visits" to appellant's office be-
fore Christmas in 1975 (Behunin Deposition at 20-21), an; 
further testified to meeting with appellant in Helper, Uta~ 
(Behunin Deposition at 34, et seq.), and in his office ic 
September 1976. Tr. 46. In stark contradiction to this 
testimony, Mrs. Behunin testified at the hearing that she onl!' 
met twice with appellant. After describing her first rneetin• 
in appellant's office, she was asked whether she "ever agair," 
met "person to person" with appellant, and she said that she 
met with him "once" after the first meeting. Tr. 18. She 
then said that the second meeting was in appellant's office 
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l 
I 
.. 
about two weeks after the first meeting, or sometime in 
January 1976. Tr. 18-19. She then was asked: 
" Q • 0 k a y , subsequent to that [ second ] visit with t1 r . 
Hansen, did you ever again meet with him person to 
person either at his office or any other location? 
1
·.A. No. 1• Tr. 19. 
6. In her deposition Mrs. Pehunin testified at 
length concerning a conversation with appellant in Helper, 
'
1 Q. Did you ever, other than that conversation in 
the Helper Club, talk to Phil Hansen after that about 
his representation of Eurr in the criminal case? 
'·A. No, 
back. I 
him, that 
there and 
Jackson." 
I was so uoset because he didn't call me 
couldn't reach him to even discuss it with 
I just gave up. I called my lawyer down 
asked him what he would suggest I do, Mr. 
Behunin DepQsi_!__!on at 48. 
Tr:is is entirely inconsistent with Mrs. Eehunin's later testi-
rr:cny that appellant did in fact call her back to discuss the 
rossibility of representing Ted Burr, when Mrs. Behunin was at 
her sister's house in Salt Lake City. 
4 6 • 
7. Mrs. Behunin was less than candid about the cor-
respondence between herself and appellant concerning the law-
cui t. She was asked: 
"C:. 
forth. 
There was correspondence 
Do you recall that? 
that went 
"A. I didn't ever write him a letter." 
Deposition at 56. 
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Mrs. Behunin later admitted that there were a number of 
letters and memoranda that passed between appellant and 
herself, and Exhibits 8 through 19 illustrate the nature ana 
range of this correspondence. 
The foregoing contradictions ~re_lr:l_th~_!_e~!imo~y-~1_Mrs~ 
Beh~nin_!:l~~_lf, and are not contradictions between the testi-
mony of Mrs. Behunin and appellant. In contrast to her testi-
mony, appellant testified in a candid, forthright and consis-
tent manner. There is not a single contradiction or inconsis-
tent statement in any part of appellant's testimony. He tes-
tified in his deposition, and the evidence is uncontradicted, 
that the letter from the Bar dated October 26, 1976, advising 
hirt of his hearing before the Screening Committee on October 
26 was received by him on October 28, the very dav of the 
hearing, and that his secretary advised the Bar office that 
appellant had a conflict in his schedule and could not appear 
on such short notice. ~-9-~_De_p_osi t_ion at 5, ~!__~eq. 
He defended his method of charging fixed or flat fees, ex-
plaining that he did not follow the pattern of "pegboard" law-
yers who charge for each telephone call. ~22~lla.!2!_'._~_D~posi: 
tion at 23, 43. He also said that he not only had the per-
mission of the corporation through Mrs. Behunin to represen: 
Mr. Burr, but that he obtained approval of such representation 
from counsel for Mr. Burr in the civil suit and from the 
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Sevier County Attorney. ~pellant's Deposition at 47, et_seq. 
At the hearing appellant explained his usual method of 
determining and charging fees. Tr. 56-60. He said that a 
flat fee is something of a gamble on his part; even though 
such a fee is often adequate, it sometimes turns out to t::e too 
low. The client, however, always knows what the exact and 
total cost of litigation will be. Tr. 105-06. Appellant said 
that although his flat fees are nonrefundable so long as he is 
ready, willing and able to perform the appropriate legal re-
oresentation, his fees are refundable if it is his fault that 
a client must retain another lawyer. Tr. 127. He also said 
that he would be willing to make a voluntary adjustment of the 
fee and an appropriate refund in this matter, but that he 
thought he had no legal obligation to do so as a result of any 
Ear proceedings. Tr. 118. And appellant said that he cer-
tainly would have answered if Mrs. Behunin had asked for a 
refund, as she testified that she did. Tr. 66-67. 
With respect to his representation of Ted Burr, appellant 
saia that the first time he ever met Mr. Burr was at a meeting 
in his office on July 22, 1976. Tr. 71. Appellant could es-
tablish the exact date because it is his practice at the first 
~nterview to take notes and to write at the top "New File" and 
Place the date. Tr. 93, 97. Since appellant never met Ted 
Eurr until July 22, 1976, he explained that it would have been 
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impossible for him to have discussed his potential representa-
tion of Burr when he met Mrs. Behunin the previous month _, 
Helper. Tr. 71, 73. Appellant did recall, however, that he 
obtained permission from Mrs. Behunin to represent Mr. Burr 
(Tr. 76) and was quite sure that he did so by virtue of 2 
telephone call from his office. Tr. 86. Appellant could fix 
the date of this call as between July 22 and July 26, 1976, 
because he first saw Mr. Burr on July 22, and he accepte'. 
Eurr's retainer on Julv 26; he would not have accepted the 
retainer prior to receiving Mrs. Behunin' s consent to his re-
present at ion of ~· r . Eur r . Tr . 8 2- 8 6 . 
The foregoing testimony is consistent with the care exer-
cised by appellant in getting the consent of everyone else in-
volved. Tex Olsen, the lawyer for Mr. Burr in the civil suit, 
consented. 3S did Kay Mclff, the Sevier County Attorney, whc 
would prosecute the criminal case. Tr. 84-85. The District 
Judge, who presided over both the civil case and crimina~ 
case, W3.s advised of the fact that appellant was representin• 
both the corporation and Mr. Burr. Tr. 103-04. (It alsc 
should be noted that co-defendants Jim Ross and Ted Burr bot~ 
came to see appellant on July 22, 1976, and both desired ar-
pellant to represent them. Eut appellant saw that their 
different positions would create a conflict if he were t: 
represent them both. He forthwith advised them that he cculr, 
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;1Jt represent both and that he could represent Mr. Burr only 
if Mrs. Behunin consented. Tr. 77.) 
Any objective examination demonstrates that the evidence 
falls far short of clear and convincing proof that appellant 
h3s violated any ethical standards of the Utah State Bar. 
III. APPELLANT'S GENERAL PHILOSOPHY IS NOT RELEVANT 
10 THIS PROCEEDING. 
Over and over again the Bar in its brief ridicules the 
"attitu:J·: of appellant and argues that his "philosophy" and 
"tr,eory" concerning the setting of fees is wrong. The Bar 
criticizes appellant's philosophy respecting his relations to 
all clients (Brief of the Utah State Bar at 46), his practice 
in regard to his other clients (Brief of the Utah State Bar at 
47), and his failure to conform to "the custom of the legal 
community" (Brief of the Utah State Bar at 48). These argu-
ments reflect the tenor of the entire proceeding against ap-
pellant. 
The record discloses that the present proceeding really 
is not an effort to suspend appellant from the practice of law 
because of any specific conduct in the matter of Kay Lou 
behunin and her co1·poration, but rather because of sharp 
pn1losophical conflicts between appellant and members of the 
Bar Commission. Since appellant is not a shy or retiring law-
yer, these conflicts in philosophy sometimes resulted in snarp 
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exchanges of opinion. During his deposition, appellant res-
ponded to criticism leveled at his practice of charging flat 
fees by calling those lawyers who charge for each hour. frac-
tion of hour, or telephone call. as "pegboard" lawyers. A_F_: 
E~ll~!'.1~~-Q~p__ci_~jti~~ at 23, 43. This carded through to tht 
hearing. After appell:::t'.lt testified th:::tt he Ind obtained t'-,c 
consent of Ted Eurr. Surr' s lawyer, and the Sevier Count\· 
Attorney. aooellant was asked if he intended to call the'.' a~ 
witnesses to supoort h'~ testimony. Appellant said 1:: 
because, even tr,ou[h t:1ev would verify ~is testir.-,ony. suer, 
verification would be unnecessary unless the Ear decided tc 
attack his credibility as a witness and then advised the 
Bar prosecutors that they could attack his credibility if they 
wishej in rebuttal. The prosecuting attorney sarcastic:ilL 
said, ''Thanks for the advice.' Appellant in similar veir, 
replied that he aid not have a fee agreement with the prose-
cutor for such advice arid would not charge by the hour. T"E 
prosecutor rejoined that he would rather go to a pegboard la~­
yer than get legal advice from appellant. Tr. 84-65. 
Exchanges such as this indicate only the tone of the oro-
ceeding. The specific philosophical differences are best il-
lustrated by excerpts from the transcript. It is ir.iportar.t. 
of course, that the entire record be examine'.l with care. ar,~ 
the only purpose of the following excerpts is to illustrate 
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tne nature of some of the discussion. 
The following exchange took place between Commissioner 
Sorenson and appellant. 
"MR. SORENSON: Well, my question raises in this 
part, Mr. Hansen, goes to this, that I suppose there 
is a certain degree of credibility given one's client 
by the person who represents the client and you rep-
resented here today that they hire you because of 
your name and reputation to champion of causes and 
represent people and so forth. Now you also said 
that in no way was she ever compromised or she was 
never in present jeopardy. I can't remember the 
exact phrase you used by your representing Mr. Burr. 
My question, I suppose, is when you filed the answer 
alleging false allegations and you in effect place 
yourself behind Kay Lou herself as saying that she is 
the truthful one in the situation and that the plain-
tiff has damaged her by his false representations. 
Then when you represent Mr. Burr in a criminal matter 
you are saying that you represent him for his truth-
fulness in the matter and put him on the stand and 
therefore, he becomes the good guy because you are 
representing him and I suppose that's what we are is 
advocates. Do you feel that that dual position in 
these two lawsuits by your name and reputation con-
stituted a conflict of interest? 
"A. Our philosophical concepts are diametrically 
[sic] opposed. If you think that because a lawyer 
represents somebody that's a good guy, therefore he's 
a good guy, and if he represents a bad guy, he is a 
bad guy, you've got it all wrong compared to what I 
think. A lawyer's role [and] the client's stand on 
their own. They don't stand behind reputation of 
their lawyer. 
"MR. SORENSEN: Do you believe that? 
"A. I certainly do or otherwise I would never 
represent a person charged with a crime for fear you 
would be the criminal. You mean to tell me if I rep-
resent a rapist that I am a sex fiend? If I repre-
sent a bank robber, I'm a thief, if I represent a 
murderer, I'm a murderer? 
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"MR. SORENSOt:: I'm askini:r you if a person comes 
to Phil Hansen because of his. reputation as being a 
super lawyer or a good--
"A. Again, innuendoes about that, but I think in 
all honesty I do have a good reputation for results I 
get in court and that has nothing to do with the 
credibility of a client or an opponent in a lawsuit. 
"MR. .SORENSON: I didn't say you stand up and 
vouch for him for the truthfulness. 
''A. That's what I think you are insinuating. 
"MR. SORENSOt,1 : You are misunderstanding. Let me 
get the question to you, Phil. so you cari understand 
it. Do you feel by virtue of the fact that you have 
acquired in this state, and I think that goes without 
sayinE, a reputation as being a good defense criminal 
lawyer. Would you agree with that? 
"F.. Precisely. 
"MR. SORE!\SO!l: Okay, now if that is true and Mr. 
Burr comes to you and says I want you to represent me 
because of your reputation of being a good lawyer, do 
you feel that he hires you because of the reputation 
that you carry into a courtroom would carry some 
power or some weifYht with it because Phil P.ansen is 
in that courtroom? 
'P.. No, I think they hire you for a reputation 
for the way you handle a lawsuit, not because your 
reputation is going to swini:r the results of the 121-1-
suit or make your defendant look like a nice i:ruy if 
you've got a nice guy reputation or a bad guv reputa-
tion. I think the two are totally unrelated and 
should be. 
''MR. SORENSON: That's what I wanted to find out, 
if that was your philosophical belief in that regard. 
Now do you feel in reference to these two complaints 
that, obviously you've stated this many times. but in 
reference to the allegations, one a criminal matter 
that you defend on and another a civil matter which 
you become a olaintiff's attorney by reference of a 
counterclaim, do you feel there is any conflict of 
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interest between your representing two people that 
are on opposite sides of one lawsuit and you spin off 
and represent another one in another lawsuit that 
coincides in the same time frame before the courts? 
"A. I think I'm perfectly proper in the action 
and I decided the canon of ethics with the consent of 
the parties permitting it." Tr. 113-16. 
Later the following exchange took place between Commissioner 
Moffat and appellant: 
"MR. MOFFAT: Phil, in relation to the method by 
which you charge for your services, do you feel that 
at any point--I'm not talking about this case in 
particular but about the principle in general--do you 
feel that at any point a client for whatever reason 
has a right to discharge his attorney? 
"A. Certainly. 
"MR. MOFFAT: Do you have any general philoso-
phical feeling about whether or not given an agree-
ment such as the one that you had with Kay Lou here 
there is a point at which there should be a refund of 
the client's money? 
"A. Yes, if it's my fault that they change law-
yers, I think that's right. 
"MR. MOFFAT: If it's not, then you don't regard 
that any of the fee is refundable? 
"A. That's right, from an obligation. I've done 
it voluntarily on a case. 
"MR. MOFFAT: That's true even if you get the fee 
one day and they discharge you the next day before 
you've done anything? 
"A. According to our agreement, yes, but in 
situations like that I've refunded--I can give you a 
glaring example. Blair Lund--I mean--what's the--
Blair is the brother--Fran Lund, his wife, came to me 
for representation, paid me four thousand somethi~g 
dollars one day and came back the next day and said 
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that she couldn't get the rest and wanted to get 
somebody else and I gave her all of it back. 
"MR. MOFFAT: I think you said on questioning by 
Mr. Fishler that you feel that you are paid to get a 
result and if you get the result--
''A. Well, not necessarily result, that's I think 
what--the results I think are what brought the repu-
tation of people to come to me for. You don't charge 
for results because you can't promise results. What 
we do is you say if we do that, if we feel that can 
be done within the abilities that you've got, but I 
never promised results. I think the results--what I 
meant to impl~ by results in that series of questions 
was that's what brings the reputation. 
"MR. l10FFJl.T: So 
upon the results you 
you hope to obtain? 
'·A. Not at all. 
them also, win, lose 
the letter. I tell 
your fee 
actually 
is not 
obtain 
in 
but 
fact based 
upon what 
In fact, that's what I tell 
or draw, phrase that I use in 
them I can't promise results 
whether I win or whether I lose or whether we break 
even. This is my fee. " Tr. 126-28. 
A short time later, Commissioner Moffat and appellant 
continued discussing their differences in philosophy: 
"MR. MOFFAT: Now Tex Olsen was representing Burr 
in the civil action against Kay Lou, is that right? 
"A. 
lon11er. 
Yes, he was. I heard today that he is no 
'·MR. MOFFAT: Phil, did you see any problem or do 
you see any problem now in representing Burr with an 
action where he gets convicted, a trial that had some 
relatively widespread notoriety and then later on 
defendin11 against the claim brought by him on behalf 
of Kay Lou in the same court and within a relatively 
short period of time? 
'·A. I still don't see any problem. I think they 
both can be handled objectively and in a professio~al 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
manner without intermingling the two. 
"MR. MOFFAT: Would 
impeachin15 Burr at the 
credibility? 
you have any difficulty in 
later trial, impeaching his 
"A. No, by a rule of law that Mr. Moyle stated, 
if the conviction is upheld--I disagree with Mr. 
Moyle's interpretation of the law, that it can be 
used even though the conviction is overturned, but 
assuming that it stands, then I think the question 
can be asked and the answer compelled. 
"MR. MOFFAT: 
conviction, there 
impeach a party, 
that? 
Well, even forgetting about the 
are lots of ways in which you can 
are there not, I mean other than 
'A. Sure, and if I thought that he was sayinf' 
things that were inconsistent with what I thought to 
be the truth, I would attempt vigorously to impeach 
him. 
"MR. MOFFAT: Would 
source from which you had 
be stating something that 
from information that you 
resenting him? 
that be true even if the 
the knowledge that he may 
was untrue would have been 
received from him in rep-
"A. I couldn't because the two cases are totally 
unrelated." Tr. 129-31. 
Mr. Fishler, the prosecutor, then engap:ed in a philoso-
phical exchange with appellant. With respect to a potential 
conflict of interests, the following discussion took place: 
''Q. Did you call Mr. Burr to testify in a 
criminal matter when he was tried in Sevier County? 
"A. I don't think I did. I'm not sure. 
"Q. You don't recall whether or not you called 
the defendant? 
"A. I really don't recall. 
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''0. Did you ever contemplate calling him as you 
theorized about defending the case? 
"A. Sure, you always contemplate. 
"Q. Otherwise if you called Mr. Burr to testify 
in that criminal case even if you contemplated it, 
you would be vouching for his credibility, wouldn't 
you? 
''A. So far as I would know, I wouldn't be 
vouching for his credibility. I would just be saying 
that I wouldn't know of any incredibility. 
"Q. Maybe not to the layman but when you call a 
witness to the stand, you are saying to the other 
lawyers in so many words that I believe what this man 
is going to say is the truth. 
"A. Oh, absolutely not. 
1
·c. You are saying though that you don't believe 
he is committing perjury? 
"A. Well, I'm saying that I don't vouch for any-
body's truthfulness but I don't put a person on if I 
know he's going to lie or think he's going to lie. I 
can vouch for that part of it but I can't say because 
I call this witness he's going to tell the truth and 
neither can you and neither can anybody else. 
··c;. Okay, but so on the one hand you might have 
to call Burr to the witness stand with the under-
standing that if you did, you wouldn't do so if you 
thought he was going to commit perjury and in the 
civil lawsuit you were going to attack his credibi-
lity? 
"A. As to the conviction, yeah. 
"Q. And this lawsuit that Burr has against Kay 
Lou, is that kind of ground to a halt? 
"A. I'm not their counsel any more. 
"0. It would be very difficult for Burr to con-
duct a civil lawsuit against Kay Lou if he were serv-
ing time at the Point, would he? 
-28-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fee: 
"A. Of course not, that ha opens frequently. 11 
Tr. 133-35. 
Mr. Fishler then turned to the matter of the attorney 
"Q. 
position 
ketplace 
vice can 
"A. 
Getting back to the fee. you are taking the 
that you have a service to sell in the-mar-
and that service and the value of that ser-
set the fee, is that right? 
Between consenting parties, yes. 
"Q. And you feel that when a client comes to 
you, that that's a total arms-length transaction and 
you are in no better baqrnining position than the 
client? 
''A. Well, I don't know how you can evaluate the 
better bargaining position, but he's free to take me 
or leave me. 
"Q. 
in some 
they are 
that? 
Clients that come to attorneys are generally 
cases distraught and emotionally upset if 
be in£ sued for $35, 000, would you agree with 
"A. Well, I'm sure that people would be dis-
traught being sued for $35,000. 
"C. Okay, so it's not a total arms-length trans-
action between two people? 
'A. Well, certainly it is, just because she 
might be upset because she's being sued doesn't put 
me in an advantage to charge a fee. She's got all 
you unique guys to go to also so the fact that she 
decides to hire me doesn't make it that I' rr. doing it 
with my knee in her chest holding a disadvantage. 
Some lawyers get $100, 000 for a lot less than I do 
for a lot less money. Some people charge a million 
dollars fees. 
11 Q. In this town? 
"A. Well, I'm not qualified in saying who gets 
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what, but if they are going to try and set down that 
we all have to charge the same price, then we are 
bordering on an anti-trust and I think that the fee, 
if the two people bargain in advance, is between the 
two people and that's as simple as I can state it and 
succinct. I don't think that the Bar Association has 
any right whatsoever to dictate what fees I should 
char~e if I do it in advance and the client has the 
right to accept or reject." Tr. 135-36. 
After the hearing concluded, memoranda were submitted by 
counsel for the parties. In their Reply Memorandum, prosecu-
tors Fishler and Cook emphasized that they were not so much 
interested in disciplining appellant for any alle1:1ed miscon-
duct in this particular matter as they were in removing hi~. 
from the practice of law because of the general methods an·j 
philosophies of appellant with respect to all clients. A few 
excerpts from that memorandum illustrate the point: 
''The prosecutors in this case are not at tacking 
the particular fee charged to Kay Lou but are attack-
ing the method utilized by Mr. Hansen as to Kay Lou 
and to all clients." ~.ll' Memorandum of Prosecu-
tors at 3. 
"Obviously a system which locks a client into a 
relationship with a member of the Bar through eco-
nomic pressure cannot be tolerated. The fact that 
Mr. Hansen is willin>r to discuss a refund to this 
particular client is immaterial since his practice is 
still to utilize the non-refund method as to all 
other clients. It is unknown how many clients in the 
past or how many in the future have been forced to 
continue with Mr. Hansen's representation because of 
this economic duress. 
"The fact that Hansen's fee system subtracts the 
cost of litigation from his flat fee can only serve 
as an inducement to Hansen not to incur necessary 
expenses on behalf of the client for litigation. Why 
-30-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should Hansen take depositions when these costs will 
merely deduct his ultimate fee in the case?'' Re.El:Y 
Memorandum of Prosecutors at 3-4. --
"During the testimony Hansen justified his fail-
ure to keep time records with the statement that some 
of his most crucial thoughts occur away from the of-
fice and, therefore, he did not think it fair to bill 
his clients on an hourly basis Mr. Hansen 
surely is not saying that even lawyers charging by 
the hour bill their clients for those thoughts oc-
curring during their morning shower. However, Hansen 
seems to think this is the case and that somehow he 
is different from other lawyers and, therefore, gra-
ciously does not charge his clients for thoughts 
occurring away from the office. Such an argument as 
was pointed out in the initial memorandum does not 
justify the failure to keep some hourly record of the 
time expended on a case. 
"In conclusion, this case is not a minor dispute 
between a 'disgruntled client' and Mr. Hansen. In-
stead it shows a complete disregard for the ethical 
resoonsibilities of a lawyer as to Kay Lou, Ted Burr, 
and all other clients presently being represented by 
Hansen under his intolerable fee program." ~ 
Memorandum of Prosecutors at 4. 
----------------
The Hearing Panel and the Bar Commissioners obviously 
adopted the prosecutor's position and sought to suspend appel-
lant from the practice of law because of his general philos-
ophy and methods of charging legal fees. If there is anything 
wrong with appellant's methods as a general matter, then the 
Ear should set forth specific guidelines with respect to flat 
fees ~ore lawyers are disciplined for charging such fees. 
IV. THE BAR'S RECOMMENDATION IS UNREASONABLE AND 
EXCESSIVE. 
In attempting to justify its recommendation of a one-year 
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suspension, the Bar argues that appellant has been the subject 
of other disciplinary proceedings throughout the years. OncE 
again, one senses the true nature of this proceeding: 
although the instant case does not itself warrant such a 
severe penalty, appellant's involvement in other disciplinary 
matters has a cumulative effect on the Bar's recommendation. 
The Bar fails to indicate, however, that none of the other 
disciplinary proceedings ever resulted in a conviction. That 
one has been previously accused and has successfully defended 
himself is surely not a matter relevant to the imposition of 2 
penalty in a subsequent matter. The Bar should know better 
than to consider old charges that were resolved in appellant's 
favor. 
The Bar urges this Court to consider the "attitude of 
appellant Hansen in its decision" in that appellant throughout 
the proceeding 
"never admitted any conflict existed never ad-
mitted that a misunderstanding between himself and 
Kay Lou existed ... never agre-ed that he was legally 
obligated to pay Kay Lou a refund ... and continually 
stated that he did not have to keep track of his time 
or records for anybody." Brief~_!'.b_~_JJ_!~_Sta t~ 
Bar at 57. 
It is true that appellant denied the charges against hirr:. It 
is true that he sought to defend himself against those charges 
to the best of his ability. If appellant is to be punisr.e2 
for acting in his own defense, it is indeed a dark day fer 
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jusLice in Utah. 
The Bar makes unwarranted assumptions of fact that 
"Hansen neither offered to withdraw •.• nor offered to refund 
Kay Lou any of her money." As noted in appellant's brief, he 
discussed the possibility of withdrawal with Mrs. Behunin at a 
~1eeting in September 1976. Mrs. Behunin left his office, how-
ever, t::i "think about" whether she really wanted appellant to 
wi thdra1o.·. Tr. 33. Appellant received no answer from Mrs. 
Benunin for- five m::intns, when he finally received the letter 
dated February 26, 1977 advising him that he had been dis-
charged. He then turned the company's files over to its new 
lawyer. Brief of Appellant at 10-12. These undisputed facts 
are based on the testimony of Mrs. Behunin. It is difficult 
to imagine how the Bar can assert that appellant refused to 
withdra1\. 
Tne Bar als::i argues that appellant's conduct is reprehen-
siole because "it is undisputed that Hansen has not refunded 
Kay Lou any of her money as of the writing of this brief." 
Brief of the Utah State Bar at 45. See also, id. at 44, 53, 
5D and 57. The Bar ther, proceeds for the first time to re-
quest that appellant be ordered to make an accounting of his 
services and to refund a portion of tne fee based upon the 
funds not expended. The Bar suggests that "if Mrs. Behunin is 
Hssa tisfied with his accounting, she could then seek recourse 
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through the Utah State Bar or throufYh her own independer,• 
court action.'' 
The Bar's assertion that no refund has been made is er. 
roneous. The Bar did not bother to make inouiries of appel. 
lant or of ~~rs. Behunin or their present counsel. If it had, 
it would have learned of negotiations between these partie: 
and that, without in any way admitting liability, appellar,• 
returned a portion of his fee to Mrs. Behunin and that genera' 
releases were executed and exchanged between appellant c.n: 
Mrs. Behunin. These negotiations and this settlement werE 
completed quite apart from the Ear proceedings, as they shoul: 
have been. The dispute between Mrs. Behunin and appellant wo' 
always a civil matter. It was not and is not relevant to thE 
matter before this Court. Important, however, is the cavalier 
fashion with which the Ear treats what it deems to be fact. 
The propriety of disciplinary measures re commende: 
against attorneys is, of course, to be evaluated in ligrit 01 
the facts of each case, and comparisons are difficult. Tr' 
perspective afforded by this Court's decisions, however 
demonstrate that the one year suspension recommended agains 1 
appellant is excessive. It is particularly excessive if. 3 
the record reflects, the Bar seeks to punish appellant for hi 
general method of conducting his profession. and not for ar. 
harm done to any client. This Court's rulings indicate tha 
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. 
:\ 
suspensions of the kind recommended by the Bar are reserved 
for lawyers who knowingly and dishonestly harm their clients 
or the system of justice itself. For example, in In re 
Macfarla~, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631 (1960), the Court 
concluded that an attorney had exercised fraud and undue 
influence upon his client while acting as her confidential 
advisor; in doing so, he drafted her will and codicils thereto 
to make himself a major beneficiary of her estate. The Court 
suspended the attorney from practice for one year. In In re 
H3tch, 108 Utah 446, 160 P.2d 961 (1945), a lawyer unlawfully 
induced his client in a workmen's compensation proceeding to 
pay him as a fee an amount four times the sum awarded him by 
the Industrial Commission. The same lawyer dishonestly col-
lected and kept a sum of money owed by his client to another. 
For these offenses, the lawyer was suspended from practice for 
one year. In In~_____h1:'.i!_s!, 29 Utah 2d 181, 506 P.2d 1272 
11973), a lawyer commingled his client's money with his own 
;;nd failed to establish a trust for his client's children in 
accordance with her instructions. He misused the money and 
concealed the fact later. For these offenses, the lawyer was 
suspended for one year. 
Appellant respectfully submits that, whatever the merits 
cf the Bar's philosophical debate with appellant, the Bar has 
~'.Jt proven any offense that verges on deception. The Bar has 
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never questioned appellant's honesty in these proceedings. 
The Bar's recommended discipline is manifestly excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was denied due process of law. The Bar in 
fact admits that the notice contained in the Complaint was ir.;-
proper. It is clear that no evidence was presented to support 1 
a fir.ding that the fee fixed in this matter was excessive. 
The Bar's brief and the record in this matter demonstrate that 
appellant has been prosecuted not so much for his actions ir. 
the instant matter but rather for his attitude and philosophy 
in general. These i terns are not relevant to this proceeding 
and should not be considered in resolving the legal questions 
before this Court. The recommendation of the Bar is excessive 
and unreasonable and has not been justified by the Bar. The 
findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Ear are irr-
proper and cannot stand. 
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